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O
ne of the many painful les-
sons learned from the 
mortgage crisis that began 
in 2007 is that foreclosure is often a 
costly, slow, ineficient, and uncer-
tain process. The additional cost and 
uncertainty for lenders are magniied 
when the balance of the mortgage 
debt exceeds the value of the collat-
eral (that is, when the borrower is 
“underwater”), and thus full recov-
ery by the lender of its investment is 
unlikely. Ways to avoid this misery 
are for the lender (usually repre-
sented by the servicer for a secondary 
market purchaser or a securitized 
trust) and the borrower to enter into 
a deed in lieu of foreclosure or for the 
lender to approve a short sale.
Beneits of Deeds in Lieu  
and Short Sales
A deed in lieu of foreclosure has 
many advantages for both par-
ties. Unlike an actual foreclosure, it 
attracts no unwanted negative pub-
lic attention, a fact that both lenders 
and borrowers may appreciate. From 
the lender’s viewpoint, it provides a 
much quicker way of obtaining title 
to the real estate than foreclosure, 
with less uncertainty, lower legal 
expenses, and a reduced risk of the 
borrower’s vandalizing or neglecting 
the property. 
A deed in lieu also has beneits to 
borrowers. Its effect on the borrow-
er’s credit score is less detrimental 
than an actual foreclosure. If prop-
erly structured, it can ensure that the 
mortgage debt is fully discharged, 
thus avoiding the risk of a deiciency 
judgment against the borrower that 
accompanies a foreclosure in most 
states. Sometimes the process of 
negotiating a deed in lieu will even 
result in a modest payment from the 
lender to the borrower to help defray 
the costs of vacating the property.
Likewise, a short sale carries the 
same beneits and advantages. In 
a short sale, the borrower conveys 
title to the mortgaged real estate to a 
third-party purchaser for a price that 
relects fair market value but is less 
than (or “short” of) the outstanding 
mortgage balance. In order for the 
borrower to convey marketable title 
to the purchaser, the lender releases 
its mortgage lien in exchange for 
receipt of all of the net sale proceeds.
The Barrier of Junior Liens
In light of these mutual advantages, 
one might have expected a large pro-
portion of the residential defaults that 
occurred during the mortgage cri-
sis to have been resolved by deeds in 
lieu or short sales. To some degree, 
this did not occur because of struc-
tural reasons; servicers often were not 
suficiently knowledgeable and well-
staffed to work out these voluntary 
arrangements with their borrowers 
in a timely manner. But there is also a 
frequent legal barrier to deeds in lieu 
and short sales: the presence of junior 
liens. If the property is also subject to 
a junior lien, as a practical matter the 
senior mortgagee can agree to a deed 
in lieu or short sale only if the junior 
lienholder consents.
The reason is simple. A deed in 
lieu or a short sale is not a foreclo-
sure. The proper foreclosure of a irst 
priority lien will eliminate all junior 
liens, thus permitting the foreclo-
sure purchaser to take clear title to 
the property. A deed in lieu or short 
sale has no such effect. Any junior 
lien will continue to encumber the 
property after the deed is delivered. 
Although the grantee of the deed 
can then foreclose against the junior 
lienor to clear the title of the lien, the 
cost and delay of doing so defeats the 
whole purpose of using a deed in lieu 
or short sale in the irst place.
Particularly during a housing mar-
ket decline, such as that of 2007–2010, 
the balance owing on some defaulted 
irst mortgages will exceed the prop-
erty’s value. In this situation, a junior 
lien has no value; if an actual fore-
closure sale were held, the proceeds 
would not be suficient to pay off the 
irst mortgage in full, much less to 
pay anything on the junior lien. But 
even if the junior lien is valueless, it 
clouds the property’s title, frustrat-
ing the use of a deed in lieu or a short 
sale and effectively forcing an oth-
erwise avoidable foreclosure. This is 
problematic because these foreclo-
sures not only involve the costs to 
borrowers and lenders noted previ-
ously but also reduce the value of 
neighboring parcels and thus impose 
a cost on neighboring owners and 
communities.  
What is needed—but what 
standard mortgage law does not pro-
vide—is a way for a borrower to 
deliver a deed in lieu or short sale 
deed that will wipe out junior liens, 
at least in cases in which they have 
no value. This article discusses a new 
model act intended to accomplish this 
result.
The Model Negotiated 
Alternative to Foreclosure Act
In 2015, the Uniform Law Commis-
sion (ULC) promulgated the Uniform 
Home Foreclosure Procedures Act 
(UHFPA), a large and complex act 
dealing with many aspects of mort-
gage foreclosure. The UHFPA was 
intended to overlay existing state 
foreclosure legislation, but thus far 
it has not achieved any enactments. 
This is not surprising, given its broad 
scope and the desires of consumer 
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and lending advocates to maintain 
any respective advantages they have 
under present foreclosure law. Broad-
scale reform of mortgage foreclosure 
law is not for the faint of heart!
In July 2017, the ULC concluded that 
one particular article of the UHFPA—
the “Negotiated Transfer” provisions 
in UHFPA Article 5—had suficient 
merit and potential for adoption, so the 
ULC carved these provisions off into 
a freestanding act labeled the Model 
Negotiated Alternative to Foreclosure 
Act (MNAFA). This act is a targeted 
response to the problem of junior liens 
hindering the use of deeds in lieu and 
short sales. It authorizes the borrower 
and lender to negotiate a transfer of the 
property to the lender and provides 
that “all . . . interests subordinate to the 
interest of the creditor that is a party to 
the proposed negotiated transfer are 
extinguished.” MNAFA § 5(a).
This result is well and good if 
the junior liens are valueless but, if 
not, wiping them out in this fash-
ion would be unwarranted and 
unfair. Hence, one of the act’s prin-
cipal objectives is to ensure that only 
fully underwater junior liens are ter-
minated by the borrower’s transfer 
of title to the lender. The act accom-
plishes this in a rather ingenious 
fashion, effectively allowing the 
junior lienholders to decide for them-
selves whether their liens are worth 
preserving. The procedure outlined 
by the act is as follows.
If the parties to the irst mort-
gage propose a negotiated transfer, 
they must irst send notice to all 
subordinate lienholders. If a judi-
cial foreclosure is already pending, 
the court sends the notice; otherwise 
it is sent by the foreclosing credi-
tor. MNAFA § 4(a) & (b). Each junior 
lienor then has 20 days from the date 
the notice was sent to object in writ-
ing to the proposed transfer. MNAFA 
§ 3(a)(4). If no objections are received 
within the 20-day period, the parties 
can complete the transfer, wiping out 
all junior interests. MNAFA § 6(a).
If a junior lienholder objects, how-
ever, it can redeem the property from 
the irst mortgage lien by tendering 
the amount of the irst mortgage obli-
gation and, in effect, buying the irst 
lien. Obviously, the junior lienor will 
do so only if it believes the property 
is worth more than the irst lien obli-
gation. If a junior lienor makes such 
a tender, the creditor holding the irst 
lien is paid in full. 
If a judicial foreclosure is pending, 
the court must set a date, not more 
than 30 days after receipt of the objec-
tion, for the objecting lienor to pay 
off the irst mortgage. MNAFA § 5(a). 
If no judicial proceeding is pending, 
the creditor must initiate a judi-
cial proceeding so the court can set 
a redemption date for the objecting 
lienor. MNAFA § 5(c). In either case, if 
the junior lienor fails to tender by the 
date set, its lien is extinguished.
To an extent, the MNAFA pro-
vides the irst mortgagee with a 
remedy that is analogous to an 
Article 9 secured party’s right to pro-
pose “strict foreclosure” (that is, the 
secured party’s retention of the col-
lateral in satisfaction of the secured 
obligation). UCC §§ 9-620 to 9-622.  
The remedies are not precisely the 
same, however. Under an Article 9 
strict foreclosure, if a junior secured 
party objects to a strict foreclosure 
proposal, the senior effectively must 
proceed with a foreclosure sale. But 
an Article 9 foreclosure sale can be 
a private sale that can happen in as 
little as a few weeks and that has no 
spillover effects on other debtors. 
By contrast, a real estate foreclosure 
must occur in a public auction that 
may take months or years to com-
plete and is likely to reduce the value 
of neighboring parcels. By requiring 
the objecting junior lienor to redeem 
its lien position (rather than allow-
ing the junior to force a foreclosure 
sale), the MNAFA quite appropri-
ately prevents the truly underwater 
junior lienholder from imposing these 
unwarranted foreclosure costs on 
the lender, the borrower, and third 
parties.  
Restricting junior lienholders to 
the option of redemption is necessary 
to achieve the act’s primary purpose: 
a fair, quick, and inexpensive reso-
lution of the foreclosure. It might 
be argued, however, that it is unfair 
to junior lienholders who have lit-
tle or no access to capital, because it 
requires an objecting junior to come 
up with the funds to redeem the 
senior mortgages. This is unlikely to 
be an issue for institutional or pro-
fessional lenders, but it might be 
problematic for some individuals. 
On balance, the act’s approach seems 
justiiable.
By its terms, the act applies only to 
transfers by a homeowner to a credi-
tor. This is well and good for deeds 
in lieu of foreclosure, but how will 
it work in a short sale situation? The 
answer is that the chain of title for 
the short sale must pass through the 
creditor. Thus, two deeds will be nec-
essary: one from the homeowner to 
the creditor and a second from the 
creditor to the short sale purchaser. 
Doubtless the creditor will insist that 
the deed it delivers be without war-
ranty of title, but the act raises no 
objection to that.
Multiple Objecting Junior 
Creditors
Because all junior creditors will 
receive notice of the proposed trans-
fer, it is possible that more than one 
of them will ile an objection. In this 
situation, the court must establish an 
orderly process for recognizing their 
rights of redemption. To accomplish 
this, the court ixes a series of dates 
and assigns a date to each junior 
lienor, in the reverse order of their 
priority (that is, the most junior lienor 
gets the earliest date). MNAFA § 5(b). 
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Each objecting junior lienor must ten-
der an amount equal to the total of 
the balances owing on all liens supe-
rior to its own. If any subordinate 
lienor fails to tender by the applicable 
date, its lien is extinguished and the 
next (more senior) lienor is entitled to 
its turn. MNAFA § 5(e).
This process is conceptually simi-
lar to the rights of junior lienholders 
in an ordinary foreclosure; all juniors 
are subject to being terminated by the 
foreclosure of a senior lien, but each 
has a common-law right to redeem its 
lien from senior liens, provided that 
they redeem before the foreclosure 
sale. The difference under MNAFA is 
that, once the notices of the proposed 
transfer are sent, redemption is the 
only course of action that will prevent 
an objecting junior’s lien from being 
extinguished. 
Some Reinements
Several other features of MNAFA are 
also worth mention. As with UHFPA, 
the act is limited to mortgages on 
one-to-four-family residential prop-
erties. MNAFA § 2(6). This restriction 
stems from the fact that it was residen-
tial foreclosures that severely clogged 
the courts and bogged down ser-
vicers during the mortgage crisis, and 
perhaps from the fact that UHFPA’s 
drafters hoped it would be easier to 
get enactments if the support of com-
mercial mortgage lenders were not 
required. Conceptually, however, the 
principles of MNAFA could be applied 
equally well to nonresidential mort-
gage loans.
There is also a limit on the ability 
of borrowers and lenders to nego-
tiate the transfer: the lender must 
accept the property in full satisfac-
tion of the debt. MNAFA § 3(a). Even 
if the property is underwater with 
respect to the irst mortgage, the 
lender cannot preserve the right to 
a deiciency judgment. This provi-
sion may help some consumers avoid 
poorly negotiated transfer deals. It 
surely corresponds with the result 
most borrowers would expect and is 
consistent with Article 9’s analogous 
prohibition on partial strict foreclo-
sure in consumer transactions. UCC 
§ 9-620(g). But nothing in the act 
prevents the lender from agreeing to 
pay the borrower some additional 
money (“cash for keys”) to help 
defray moving expenses and encour-
age the borrower’s agreement.
The act’s procedures and restric-
tions apply only if the parties opt to 
be subject to it, and so state in their 
agreement. MNAFA § 3(a)(2). If the 
lender’s title examination discloses 
no junior liens, the parties may pre-
fer to use a traditional deed in lieu (in 
which case the act does not apply). 
MNAFA § 6(f). If there are multiple 
owners of the real estate, the choice 
to proceed under the act is available 
only if all the owners agree. MNAFA 
§ 3(a)(1). Obligors who are liable 
on the debt, however, but have no 
interest in the real estate (for exam-
ple, guarantors), need not consent 
because they have no downside risk.
Although the act’s process will 
be of greatest use to irst mortgage 
lenders, it is equally available to a 
junior mortgagee. The act has no 
effect, however, on mortgages or 
liens senior to the mortgage that is 
the subject of the negotiated trans-
fer. MNAFA § 6(a), § 5 cmt. 3. For 
example, assume a home is subject 
to an unpaid property tax lien and a 
homeowner’s association lien, both 
of which are superior in priority to a 
irst mortgage. If the borrower and 
the mortgagee engage in a negotiated 
transfer under the act, the mortgagee 
will take title subject to the HOA and 
tax liens (the same result as in a con-
ventional foreclosure).
Conclusion
As noted above, underwater junior 
liens impede negotiated settlements 
of defaulted mortgage loans and thus 
impose unwarranted foreclosure-
related costs on borrowers, lenders, 
neighboring landowners, and local 
communities. The authors conclude 
that the Model Negotiated Alterna-
tive to Foreclosure Act provides a 
careful, balanced, and thoughtful 
solution to this problem. It is nei-
ther pro-borrower nor pro-lender, but 
is designed to facilitate cooperation 
between the parties to a mortgage 
loan when they ind it in their mutual 
interest. It would not replace any 
aspect of the traditional foreclosure 
process but instead provides an alter-
native that can be advantageous to 
both parties. It would protect con-
sumers who use it against the risk of 
a future deiciency judgment, as we 
think it should, and would prevent 
truly underwater junior lienholders 
from compromising eficient settle-
ments by demanding “ransom” for 
the release of worthless junior liens. 
In sum, it is an excellent addition to 
the panoply of mortgage remedies 
and deserves favorable consideration 
from state legislatures throughout the 
nation. n 
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